procedures, and I managed to induce her to have a mammogram once every 4 or 5 years.
The administrator of my clinic told me that I should discharge her from my practice because of her horrid nonadherence to appointments. I would not do that. I knew that she trusted me as much as anyone. (She always asked for a copy of my note and made sure that I had not said anything about her having a mental illness.) If I abandoned her, she would not go to another doctor and her hypertension would kill her. Eventually, she developed atrial fibrillation. I tried to treat her with warfarin, but her INR was rarely more than 1.2. She would miss many appointments in the anticoagulation clinic, then show up, requiring me to re-register her because they felt that they could not take care of someone so nonadherent. She had two minor strokes and largely recovered from them. She began to come in for more of her appointments, but still missed at least half of them. One day she showed up in clinic, announced that I had cared for her for 25 years, and gave me a gift and a card saying that I had saved her life.
The intent of current policy to improve quality and outcomes of care while lowering costs 2 is admirable, but current quality metrics give physicians and health systems substantial incentives to steer clear of patients such as mine. What accountable care organization (ACO) would want to attract or retain them? Hwang and his coauthors suggest that high visit no-show rates should be used to identify patients for whom additional interventions are needed to improve quality and reduce costs. I agree, but no combination of structural or process changes, behavioral interventions, care coordination programs or home visits will produce good outcomes for such patients at costs comparable to those from middle class neighborhoods who are less likely to have the kind of complex social, psychological and medical problems that contribute to not showing up. ACOs operate under incentives to structure their systems to make it less likely that psychosocially complex patients such as mine will ever come through their doors. Doctors who are paid for performance will not despair at the loss of a patient with a glycosylated hemoglobin level of 11, chronically uncontrolled blood pressure, or any other suboptimal outcome that undermines their performance scores.
Certainly, we should find ways of encouraging better quality of care, but that should not be done in ways that penalize providers of complex patients who often are multiply disadvantaged. All of the academic health systems that I know (other than those based at public hospitals) possess the talent to care for such patients, but also the talent to avoid them. We must not create systems that allow them to make the wrong choice. Rather than helping to diminish health disparities, pay for performance and so-called accountable care as currently operationalized are likely to contribute to the perpetuation of the kind of stark inequality across demographic groups that distinguishes American health care from that in other nations with advanced economies. 3, 4 Let's scrap these perverse incentives, and replace them with something that much more fully accounts for the complexity and challenges involved in the care of those who need our help the most, keeping in mind the words of Emma Lazarus inscribed on base of the Statue of Liberty.
